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Chief, Criminal Law Division
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DOUGLAS BRENT MALAR,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

No. 43617
Kootenai Co. Case No.
CV-2015-3503
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING

)
Respondent.

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this case this Court raised its own theory of issue preservation and then
crafted and applied a legal standard contrary to established precedent of the Idaho
Supreme Court. Malar v. State, Docket No. 43617, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 674
(Idaho App., September 12, 2016) (copy attached). The state seeks rehearing.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On May 18, 2015, Malar filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his
May 11, 2012 judgment of conviction for felony DUI. (R., pp. 4-9, 11-12.) Malar raised
three claims: (1) that he received "ineffective assistance of council [sic] for failing to
raise issues at appropriate times," (2) that "law enforcement withheld information
favorable to the defence [sic]," and (3) that he was "persuaded to plea [sic] guilty by
threats from councel [sic]."

(R., p. 5; see also p. 9 (supporting affidavit).)

He

specifically alleged in relation to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, failing to inform him "exactly what
constitutes driving under the influence," and proceeding to arraignment without
discovery.

(R., p. 6.) The remedy he sought was to "enter a plea of not guilty and

proceed with trial." (Id.)
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting that the petition was
untimely. (Aug., pp. 10-11.) Malar's response did not "disagree that the statutory time
to file his petition for post-conviction relief appears to have run."

(Aug., p. 14.) He

contended, however, that the time for filing should be tolled because his attorneys
"advised there was nothing further to be done" to challenge the judgment, and were
thus "inefficient."

(Aug., pp. 14-15.)

He supported this response with an affidavit

alleging that various attorneys informed him that he could not challenge his conviction.
(R., pp. 14-15.) Specifically:
3.
In May 2012, after I was sentenced, I asked my Public Defender
about appealing my case because I still felt I was not guilty. When my
probation was set, Ms. Sears informed me there was no further action I
could take on the matter.
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4.
When I violated my probation in September 2012, I again asked if
there was a way to retract my plea, or appeal my case, and I was
informed there was not.
5.
In December 2014, I asked Lisa Cheeseboro, the assigned Public
Defender, about having the issue revisited. She informed me she was not
aware of a way to do so.
6.
Christopher Schwartz was assigned as my Public Defender when
my sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. I asked him about
appealing my case and was told I could not appeal my sentence or
conviction regardless of the fact that I entered an Alford Plea. I entered a
Rule 35 plea at that time.
(R., p. 15.)
The district court granted the motion for summary dismissal.

(R., pp. 17-24.)

The district court stated:
Petitioner's time to file an appeal expired forty-two (42) days after entry of
judgment and the time to file a petition for post-conviction relief lapsed
In this case
one year from the expiration of the time for appeal.
Petitioner's time for appeal lapsed on June 22, 2012, and his time to file a
motion for post-conviction relief lapsed on June 23, 2013. Petitioner
alleges that due to ineffective assistance of counsel the statute of
limitations governing his motion for post-conviction relief should be
equitably tolled. The State alleges that equitable tolling does not apply in
Petitioner's circumstances and that Petitioner has failed to make out a
prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., pp. 18-21 (citations omitted).)

The district court determined that the statute of

limitation is measured from when the petitioner knew the facts underlying his claims.
(R., pp. 19-20.) The district court found that "Petitioner knew, or reasonably should
have known, of the factual basis for the claim at the very latest by September of 2012.
At that time Petitioner still had seven months to file a petition for post-conviction relief."
(R., p. 24.) The district court then stated its conclusion:
This Court finds Petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known,
the basis for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also
knew, or should have known, the basis for his remaining claims of threats
3

to enter into the plea agreement, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Court
recognizes that Petitioner may not have discovered that he had the
opportunity to file a petition for post-conviction relief until the time he was
incarcerated, but his discovery is of little import. This Court recognizes
that equitable tolling is a stringent standard and where, as here, a
petitioner has the basis of knowledge for his claim prior to the expiration of
time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief; the statute of limitations
will not be tolled.
(R., p. 24.)
On appeal Malar argued that "the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition because although a claim that counsel failed to appeal his
revocation of probation [in 2015] was not raised in his petition, the claim was tried by
the consent of the parties." Slip Op., p. 1. The state argued "the district court correctly
granted the motion for summary dismissal because the issue [of ineffective assistance
of counsel in the 2015 probation revocation proceedings] was not raised in [Malar's]
petition and the claim could not have been tried by consent because there was no trial."
Id. This Court did not accept Malar's argument, but instead addressed the case on an
issue it raised sua sponte:
We hold that the district court treated the issue of whether trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to appeal from the revocation of probation as if it
were raised in the petition. Because the claim was actually considered
and ruled upon by the district court, the claim is properly before this Court.
Slip Op., p. 5.

The state seeks rehearing of this holding because it is contrary to

precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court.

ISSUE ON REHEARING
Is rehearing appropriate because this Court has decided a question of
substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court?
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ARGUMENT
Rehearing Is Appropriate Because This Court Has Decided A Question Of
Substance Probably Not In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme
Court
A.

Introduction
In support of his tolling argument (Aug., pp. 14-15), Malar submitted an affidavit

alleging that different appointed counsel in 2012, 2014 and 2015, all misled him on his
right to file an appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief (R., p. 15). This district
court considered these claims in the context they were provided, specifically whether
they tolled the running of the statute of limitation on the claims asserted in his petition.

1

(R., pp. 17-24.) This Court's holding that it can properly consider the factual allegations
in the affidavit as if they were claims asserted in the petition, Slip Op., p. 5, is directly
contrary to precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court, and therefore merits rehearing.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petition for rehearing is addressed "in the same manner" and "upon the same

grounds" as a petition for rehearing by the Idaho Supreme Court. I.AR. 116. Petitions
for rehearing are governed by I.AR. 42, which sets forth no particular criteria for

1

This Court's statement that the district court addressed the allegations of the affidavit
in opposition to the state's motion for summary dismissal as if they were "raised in the
petition," Slip Op., p. 5, is incorrect. The district court considered those factual claims
only in the context they were provided (to support Malar's tolling argument) and
determined that they did not toll the statute of limitations. (R., pp. 17-24; see also Aug.,
pp. 14-15 (Malar's tolling argument); 8/25/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 1 - p. 9, L. 4 (counsel arguing
for tolling and also stating an intent to amend the petition to include claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel at subsequent times if the current claims were dismissed).)
Indeed, it makes no sense for the district court to dismiss claims that counsel was
ineffective in 2014 and 2015 on the basis that the facts underlying those claims were
known to Malar in 2012. (R., p. 24.)
5

granting rehearing.

I.A.R. 42.

However, factors considered by the Idaho Supreme

Court in deciding whether to grant review include "[w]hether the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the
Idaho Supreme Court." I.A.R. 118(b)(2)

C.

This Court's Decision To Treat Factual Allegations In An Affidavit Submitted In
Opposition To A Motion For Summary Dismissal As If They Were A Claim Made
In The Petition Is Contrary To Precedent Of The Idaho Supreme Court
"It is clearly established under Idaho law that a 'cause of action not raised in a

party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be
considered for the first time on appeal. "' Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 , 523-24, 236
P.3d 1277, 1283-84 (2010) (citations omitted).

This Court's holding treating factual

allegations in Malar's affidavit in opposition to the state's motion as if they were claims
raised in his pleadings is directly contrary to this "clearly established " law. Therefore
this Court has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and rehearing is warranted .

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to grant rehearing and affirm the
summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 19th day of October, 016.

Kenneth K. Jergens n
Deputy Attorney Gener
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of October, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING by emailing an electronic copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

K nneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney Gener I
KKJ/dd
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 43617
DOUGLAS BRENT MALAR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
'V.

ST ATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 674
Filed: September 12, 2016
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai
County. Hon. Cynthia K. C. Meyer, District Judge.
Order dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and case remanded.
Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
aUSKEY, Judge
Douglas Brent Malar appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Malar contends the district court erred in summarily

dismissing his post-conviction petition because although a claim that counsel failed to appeal
i1is revocation of probation was not raised in his petition, the claim was tried by the consent of
:he parties. The State asserts the district court correctly granted the motion for summary
dismissal because the issue was not raised in the petition and the claim could not have been
tried by consent because there was no trial. We hold the district court addressed the claim as if
it was raised in the petition and fully considered it on the merits and so, because the issue is
properly before this Court, we need not address whether it was tried by consent. Additionally,
because the district court incorrectly held the claim was time-barred, the order granting
summary dismissal of that claim is reversed and the case remanded.
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I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Malar was sentenced in 2012 based upon his guilty plea to one count of felony driving
under the influence in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. He was sentenced to a unified term
')f four years, with two years determinate, and placed on probation. No appeal was filed. On
.:anuary 9, 2015, following a determination that Malar had violated various terms and
··:onditions of probation, the district court revoked probation and executed the underlying
2entence. Malar filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion; no appeal was filed from the order
revoking probation or the order on the Rule 35 motion.
Malar filed a petition for post-conviction relief on May 18, 2015. Therein, he alleged
as a basis for post-conviction relief: 1) counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues at
appropriate times; 2) law enforcement withheld information favorable to the defense; and 3) he
,,vas persuaded to plead guilty by threats from counsel. Later in the petition, Malar claimed
additional instances of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: 1) counsel failed to file a
motion to suppress; 2) counsel failed to inform him of the elements of driving under the
influence; and 3) counsel wished to proceed to arraignment without discovery.

Malar

:::pecifically petitioned from the January 9, 2015, order; although, he called it the date of
sentence rather than the date of probation revocation.
Little detail regarding the claims was provided in Malar' s first affidavit attached to the
)etition. Malar filed a second affidavit following the State's motion for summary dismissal. In
'hat affidavit, Malar provided more detail, much of which related to the underlying criminal
conviction. The relevant portions are as follows:
4.

5.

6.

When I violated my probation in September 2012, I again asked [my
public defender] if there was a way to retract my plea, or appeal my case,
and I was informed there was not.
In December 2014, I asked [my public defender], the assigned [p]ublic
[d]efender, about having the issue revisited. She informed me she was not
aware of a way to do so.
[Public defender] was assigned as my [p]ublic [d]efender when my
sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. I asked him about appealing
my case and was told I could not appeal my sentence or conviction
regardless of the fact that I entered an Alford Plea [sic].
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The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal, arguing the petition was
untimely filed. Malar's counsel responded, arguing the district court should equitably toll the
time for filing the petition. The State requested the petition be summarily dismissed.
The district court granted the State's motion.

First, although the district court

referenced paragraphs two through six of Malar' s second affidavit wherein Malar listed four
occasions on which he asked for an appeal, the court made findings on only three of those
~lates. The district court made no findings regarding Malar' s claim that he asked for an appeal
after the probation revocation in January of 2015. As to the three dates for which the district
i::ourt did find that Malar requested an appeal, the court held, "Petitioner has made out a prima
fa.cie case of ineffective assistance of counsel: Petitioner has demonstrated, and the state has
not challenged, that he requested an appeal of his conviction, and Petitioner has suffered
prejudice because he thereby lost the opportunity to appeal."

However, the district court

:.iltimately concluded that because Malar's request for an appeal was from his original
'~onviction, the petition was time-barred in its entirety, and there was no basis to equitably toll
the time for filing the petition. The district court then granted the State's motion for summary
dismissal on that ground.
II.
ANALYSIS

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.

::.c. § 19-4907;

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v.

3earshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,
)21, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must
:0rove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for postr;onviction relief is based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App.
2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action.
Junlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much
:nore than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under
!.daho Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l). Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be
·1erified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits,
:
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ecords, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the petition must state

·,vhy such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. LC. § 19-4903. In other
3

words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266
?.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post~onviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

When

r;onsidering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the
petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory
.a.llegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law.
~oman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner,

: 10 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the
trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences
'c0 be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 712,

714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted
evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven
by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a
?rima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do
not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281
(2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary
dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a
natter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed
in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may
be appropriate even when the State does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Roman,
~25 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
'..'acts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
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Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920,923 (Ct. App. 2008). If a genuine issue of

:naterial fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual
issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized
~y the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts
which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,675,227
? .3d 925, 929 (201 O); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P .3d at 923. Over questions of law, we

<::xercise free review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136
~.daho 367,370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
Malar asserts on appeal his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
<ippeal after probation was revoked was tried by the consent of the parties. The State claims
·ihe issue could not have been tried by consent because absent a trial, there can be no "trial" by
-:onsent, and moreover, that theory is specifically exempted from summary dismissal
proceedings. We hold that the district court treated the issue of whether trial counsel was
iaeffective for failing to appeal from the revocation of probation as if it were raised in the
petition. Because the claim was actually considered and ruled upon by the district court, the
daim is properly before this Court. Because we freely review the issue, we can determine
whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim.
In his petition, Malar claimed his trial counsel failed "to raise issues at appropriate
~:imes." Broadly speaking, this could include, among other things, failing to file an appeal from
:he revocation of probation, and the district court apparently read the claim as involving the
Bling of the various appeals.

Malar provided additional factual support for this claim in

9aragraphs four through six of his second affidavit, where he asserted he requested an appeal
,,m his case and counsel declined to file one. As such, Malar raised and factually supported a
daim which, if true, would entitle him to relief. The State conceded and the district court
f:'ound Malar' s trial counsel rendered deficient performance for failing to file the appeal. The
rlistrict court also found Malar suffered prejudice as a result of the failure because he lost the
opportunity to appeal. This is because prejudice is presumed when the court finds a petitioner
requested an appeal, but one was not filed. See Roe v. Flores Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
In the district court's order granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the court
found that Malar sought post-conviction relief based on claims of ineffective assistance of
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counsel and a coerced guilty plea.

The district court cites to Malar's second affidavit,

specifically to paragraphs two through six, when discussing Malar's request for appeals.
Thereafter, the district court cites generally to the second page of the affidavit and states, in
part: "Petitioner avers that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he had asked
'Nhether he could appeal his conviction on three occasions and in every instance he was told
that he could not appeal the conviction." The district court further cites from Malar's affidavit
to note, "Petitioner alleges that he asked his public defender in May of 2012, September of
2012, and again in December of 2014, if he could appeal his case and each time was told he

-:::ould not." As noted, the district court did not reference the January 2015 discussion regarding
appeal.
The district court denied the claim erroneously believing it was time-barred.

In

paragraphs two through six of Malar' s second affidavit, Malar references four dates on which
:1e requested an appeal:

May 2012 (paragraph three); September 2012 (paragraph four);

December 2014 (paragraph five); and January 2015 (paragraph six).

The district court

correctly determined that all of the claims except for the claim relating to the filing of an
appeal from the revocation of probation were time-barred. However, as to the claim regarding
trial counsel's failure to file an appeal from the revocation of probation, the district court did
Jot recognize that appealing the case was not limited to the original judgment of conviction,
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but could also include appealing from the order revoking probation and the order on the
Rule 35 motion, both of which would be timely claims. Moreover, the district court erred in
':'ailing to make a factual finding regarding the January 2015 request for an appeal and in
:':inding both the December 14, 2014, and January 9, 2015, claims were time-barred.
In short, because the claim on which the district court found Malar was entitled to relief
·vas not time-barred, it was error to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal.
III.
CONCLUSION

The district court correctly found that any claims relating to the original judgment of
r~onviction were time-barred and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to file an appeal as requested by Malar from the revocation of probation and the
order on the Rule 35 motion. However, because the district court erroneously held that claim
·.vas time-barred and dismissed Malar's petition for post-conviction relief, we reverse the order
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summarily dismissing that claim and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The summary dismissal of all the other claims is affirmed.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.
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